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Presumptions
OTIS H. FIsK*
We, of the legal profession, shall never get out of the quagmire of
the Law of Presumptions until we shall have agreed upon certain
premises.
By not following the lead of the courts too closely, and by approach-
ing the subject from the outside with a more independent spirit of
analysis, the writer believes more progress can be made in establish-
ing the desired premises.
Starting with the analysis of the great body of our law, we find
that relationships are regulated by a branch of that law, which gives
or assigns to a certain grouping of facts certain effects. The "cer-
tain grouping of facts" constitutes a relationship. The "certain
effects" are the rights and duties following or flowing from the re-
lationship. This process of giving or assigning to certain groupings
of facts certain effects is the regulation of relationships.
That branch of the law is called Substantive Law. Its function is
to regulate relationships.
That establishes our first premise.
Carrying the analysis further, we discover another branch of the
law, which regulates the proof and disproof of relationships, which is
another way of saying proof and disproof of rights and, duties, for
rights and duties are proved or disproved by proving or disproving
the relationship from which they spring.
That branch of the law is the Law of Proof. Its function is to
regulate the proof and disproof of rights and duties.
That is our second premise.
Pursuing the analysis a little further, we learn, that in courts
rights and duties must be proved or disproved, as the case may be,
before they will be recognized or enforced or denied, as the case mawr
be, and they must be proved or disproved to the satisfaction of a
judicial organ, which, in form, can be either individual (for example,
one judge, a referee) or collegiate (for example, more than one judge,
a jury, combined judge and jury); and that organ in reaching its
conclusions can consider only what is placed before it in the form of
proof-it cannot go outside the proof placed before it, in making its
*A. B. Yale, 1892; Ph.D. Heidelberg, Germany, 1895; Dr. juris-Heidelberg,
Germany, 1896; LL.B.-University of Cincinnati,. 1899. Since i899 engaged in
the active practice of the law at Cincinnati. For more than ten years Professor
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decisions-its function is, to decide facts upon the basis of the proof
placed before it, and only upon that basis.
That is our third premise-a composite one, it is true, but not
objectionable on 'that score.
Proceeding with the analysis of the Law of Proof, we find there ex-
ist different means or methods or ways of placing the proof before
the judicial organ just mentioned, which are designated Admissions,
Judicial Notice and Evidence.
Admissions are made by the parties. Facts admitted by them are
deemed proved by the admitting of them by the parties. Admissions
are acts of the parties. They constitute a waiver by the parties of
formal inferential proof of the facts admitted. The facts admitted are
placed in proof by act of the parties and are undisputed by the
parties and indisputable by the law.
Facts of which judicial notice is taken are deemed proved without
any act of the parties. No formal inferential proof of them is required.
They are deemed by law proved as a matter of course. The law
waives formal inferential proof of them. They are placed in proof by
act of the law and are undisputed by the law and indisputable by the
parties.
In Admissions we have waivers by the parties. In Judicial Notice
we have waivers by the law. By both, undisputed facts are placed
in proof, and the organ deciding those facts must be satisfied with
such proofs of them, i. e., it must decide they are proved. That
decision is not the result of an inferential process of or by that organ.
Evidence is that which is adduced or adducible by the parties to
prove what is not already deemed proved, or to prove or further
prove what is already deemed proved, or to disprove what is, or may
become, deemed proved. "To prove or further prove what is already
deemed proved" is, of course, a work of supererogation, but it is not
impossible. A party could, for instance, introduce evidence to prove
something of which judicial notice is taken or which is admitted.
Evidence must be adduced by the parties. It is placed in proof
by the parties.
To repeat, there are three means or methods or ways of placing
proof before the judicial organ which is to decide the facts, namely,
Admissions, Judicial Notice and Evidence; and there is no other.
That commingling of functions and definitions gives us our fourth
premise.
Further analysis of the Law of Proof reveals this: After proof has
been placed before the judicial organ which is to decide disputed facts.
there are allowed that organ two processes in reaching its conclusions.
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as to those facts. In one of them the organ may or may not reach a
certain conclusion. In the other, it must reach a certain conclusion.
In each it makes an inference. Indeed, that organ can act only by
way of inference in deciding disputed facts.
Our fifth premise is just that, namely, in deciding disputed facts
the judicial organ deciding them can act only by way of a process of
inference.
A corollary of the above is, that the function of deciding disputed
facts cannot be exercised by that organ until that from which an
inference can be made is placed in proof before it.
One of the two processes of inference allowed that organ is, as
already indicated, voluntary-the organ may or may not reach a
certain conclusion. The other is involuntary or compulsory-the
organ must reach a certain conclusion.
Those two processes constitute our sixth premise.
The process of the voluntary inference should today be called
"presumptio hominis"; and the involuntary or compulsory one,
"presumptio juris".
Let us explain more in detail.
Presumption is a process of reasoning by which something not
already proved by admissions' or by judicial notice is deemed proved.
The term "presumption" comes from the "presumptio" of the
Roman system of law.
The primary distinction between presumptions in our law termin-
ology is that between presumptio juris and presumptio hominis.
Sometimes the English equivalents are given as " presumption of
law" and "presumption of fact". The true distinction is, not be-
tween law and fact, but between law and man. Presumptio hominis-
is not the same as presumptiofacti. "Homo" does not mean "factum"
In every presumption, whether juris or hominis, a fact is involved.
In every presumption, in the Law of Proof, a fact is, by inference,
deemed proved.
Presumptio juris is a presumption in which an inference of fact is.
made; presumptio hominis is also a presumption in which an in--
ference of fact is made. In each of them the inference is made by
man-the homo figures in each of them. But in the presumptio juris
the law says the inference must be made-the homo has no discretion,
he involuntarily makes the inference; while in the presumptio hominis-
the law says the inference may be made-the homo has a discretion,
he voluntarily makes the inference. In the presumptio juris the law-
'By "admissions" in this article are meant admissions in pleadings and admis-
sions in court outside of pleadings, both of the conclusive type.
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in effect makes the inference, by controlling the homo; in the pre-
sumptio hominis the homo makes the inference, uncontrolled by the
law. It is, therefore, not difficult to understand how the one can be
called an inference by law, and the other, an inference by man; and
the one process called presumptio juris, and the other, presumptio
hominis, for the Latin genitives here import agency, in addition to,
if not rather than, possession-"by" is a more exact translation than
"of" in connection with them. Thus understood, the meaning of the
two Latin phrases is clear.
It happens that who the homo is makes no difference. He may be
embodied in the form of a judge or judges, or in the form of a jury, or
in some other form of human beings.
A fact voluntarily inferred by the homo is nothing but the result
of an inference made by human reasoning (logic). But when we
come to a fact involuntarily inferred by the homo, we have a different
problem, because it is not necessarily the result of logical inference.
Indeed, the result is sometimes most illogical, and sometimes ab-
solutely false when compared with the real truth. It is sometimes
the result of logical reasoning; sometimes it is not. It is always the
result of what is called "legal reasoning", 2 which has as its absolute
basis, not logic and truth, but expediency.
The existence of the fact deemed proved by a presumption is
questionable both in law and in the human mind. But the law
applies expediency in dealing with the situation. It says it is some-
times expedient to allow the human mind full sway in making in-
ferences in determining facts. Sometimes, it says, it is expedient
to control the processes of the human mind (logic) in making in-
ferences in determining facts. Where we have the "full sway" of
logic we have a presumptio hominis. Where we have the "control"
of logic we have a presumptio juris. Where the control is conditional
we have a rebuttable presumptio juris. Where the control is abso-
lute we have an irrebuttable or conclusive presumptio juris. In the
presumptio hominis truth is the goal, and logic has full sway. In the
presumptio juris law has conditional or absolute sway, and its action
may produce a result in accord with truth, or a result opposed to
truth. In the presumptio hominis human reasoning controls the proc-
ess. In the presumptio juris legal reasoning controls the process, and
it may or may not act in the same way and with the same result as
human reasoning. That is to say, truth may or may not result from
legal reasoning.
2 0n "legal reasoning" see James B. Thayer, "A Preliminary Treatise on Evi-
dence at the Common Law" pp. 270-276.
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As already shown, an inference is involved in every presumption.
That from which the inference is made is the base of the presump-
tion. This base is necessarily proof in the case, because in the proof
or disproof of rights and duties the homo can consider nothing that is
not proof, or, to express it positively, the homo can consider only what
is proof in the case.
Every presumption is clearly a part of the Law of Proof. An in-
ference from proof is made in it. Proof is produced by it. It begins
and ends with proof. Every presumption is a step in the process of
proving or disproving rights or duties. It is inseparable from "proof"
the noun, and from "prove" the verb.
The law attaches no special significance to whether or not a partic-
ular fact is deemed proved by the inference made in a particular
presumptio hominis, unless perhaps the discretion in making the in-
ference is abused, in which instance the abuse is corrected, but the
process of making the inference is not controlled, an example of
which would be the setting aside of a special verdict or a finding of a
fact on the ground that it is contrary to the weight of, or not
supported by, the proof. The law says that a particular fact may be
deemed proved by the process of a presumptio hominis, but does not
have to be deemed proved by it. It says that the process, or the step,
of a presumptio hominis must be gone through with, but that is the
only compulsion that exists in connection with a presumptio hominis;
and that is the only important thing in a presumptio hominis in the
eyes of the law, unless, as already mentioned, perhaps where the
discretion in making an inference is abused, for man is sometimes
wild with his logic. But the law does attach special significance to
whether or not a particular fact is deemed proved by the inference
made in a particular presumptio juris. The matter is so important that
the law says, not only must the process, or the step, of a presumptio
juris be gone through with, but a particular fact must be deemed
proved by it.
Although the presumptio hominis is relatively unimportant in the
Law of Proof, the term or expression "presumptio hominis" should
not be discarded entirely, because it is useful to contrast it with
"presumptio juris". But when we speak of presumptions, we almost
invariably mean presumptiones juris; and when the word "presump-
tion" is used alone, it should be confined to meaning presumptio juris.
From here on in this article it has that meaning, unless the context
shows otherwise.
While the base of a presumption is always in the proof, it is not
always evidence. It is always a fact or facts, but that fact or those
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facts may be proved by admissions, or by judicial notice, or by
evidence.
As just indicated, the base of a presumption may be limited to
a single fact or embrace several or many facts. It may be-as broad
as the every-day or usual affairs of life or experience of mankind,
which are always deemed in the proof in any and every case--the
homo always considers them in the proof or disproof of rights and
duties, and if they were not proof in the case the horno could not
consider them, because the homo can consider nothing that is not
proof. The every-day or usual affairs of life or experience of mankind
are judicially noticed, and they are thereby introduced as proof in a
case. To repeat, they are in the proof in every case in our system of
law.
Because of the effects produced, the presumptiones juris are di-
vided into their two main classes, already mentioned, namely, irre-
buttable (conclusive) and rebuttable. An irrebuttable presumption
is one which the law does not allow to be defeated. It is absolutely
conclusive at all times. A rebuttable presumption is one which the
law allows to be defeated.
A rebuttable presumption always determines the burden or duty
of going forward with proof, in the sense of thrusting upon the party
against whom the presumption operates the burden or duty of going
ahead with proof on the point determined by the presumption-in
other words, and in short, the burden or duty of attacking with
counterproof the fact deemed proved by the presumption.
Irrebuttable or conclusive presumptions are terminative of the
question as to the existence of a fact. A fact deemed proved by them
is not subject to attack. There is no further going forward with
proof on a fact deemed proved by them. They are definitive. The
only attack with which an irrebuttable presumption is associated is
one on the base of the presumption. The characteristic difference be-
tween a rebuttable and an h-rebuttable presumption is, that, in the
case of the former both the base of it and the fact deemed proved by
it are subject to attack, while in the case of the latter only the base
of it is subject to attack.
"Overcoming a presumption" means, that the presumption as a
controlling process of reasoning is prevented fromfurtherfunctioning; it
is checkmated, as it were-"the king is dead"-the presumption
as a controlling process of reasoning becomes functus officio. What
results is, that the process of reasoning which the law says must be
applied ceases to control, and the matter is decided by a process of
reasoning conducted by man alone. There are two steps in "re-
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butting" a presumption (presumptio juris). The first step is that of
"overcoming" the presumption as a controlling process of reasoning.
That results in the substitution of a presumptio hominis as the con-
trolling process of reasoning. The second step is that of defeating-
the inference made in the presumptio juris by an inference made in
the presumptio hominis. A presumption may be "overcome" with-
out being "rebutted." That is the case when the inference made in
the presumptio hominis is the same as that made in the presumptio
juris. A presumption is not rebutted until the inference made in the-
presumptio hominis is to the contrary of that made in the presumption.
So "overcoming" a presumption is not the same as "rebutting" a
presumption. "Overcoming" a presumption simply means van-
quishing it as the controlling process of reasoning. "Rebutting" a
presumption means, ultimately defeating the inference made in it by
another inference made in a different process of reasoning, namely,
a presumptio hominis. "Overcoming" a presumption does not de-
feat the inference made in the presumption. "Rebutting" it does,
and "overcoming" is only a step in the process directed to that end.
The process is one of attack on the fact deemed proved by the pre-
sumption, and is, actually or at least logically, not started in motion
until the presumption has already become applicable. Before a pre-
sumption becomes applicable the only attack possible in connection
with it is one on the base of it. Such an attack precipitates a contest
over the existence of the base of the presumption. If the base of the
presumption is not established, there is no necessity to "rebut" the-
presumption, or even to "overcome" it. But once the base is es-
tablished, there arises the necessity of attacking the fact deemed
proved by the presumption, if that fact is not to stand. The pre-
liminary skirmish in that attack is constituted by the effort to "over-
come" the presumption. Once that skirmish is successful, the attack
may or may not prove successful in the outcome, depending upon
whether or not the presumption in the end becomes "rebutted."
It is clear that an irrebuttable presumption can never be "rebutted",
or even "overcome", because the fact deemed proved by it is never-
open to attack.
Let us, for illustration, take the presumptions relating to mental
capacity for crime, at common law. Mental incapacity for crime
is conclusively presumed to exist if the person accused is not over-
seven years old. Once it is established the accused is not over seven
years old, the matter of proof as to mental capacity is ended- no
other proof on the question of mental capacity can be considered,
i. e., there is no contest over the fact deemed proved by the presump-
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tion. If there is any controversy, it is confined to the question
whether or not the accused is over seven years old, i. e., the contest is
over the base of the presumption. 3 After the age of seven and until
the fourteenth year, mental incapacity is presumed to exist, but this
presumption is rebuttable. The first attack here is centered on the
age of the accused, i.e., the base of the presumption. Once the age is
established to be between seven and fourteen years, other proof
relating to mental capacity for crime in the particular case may be
considered, i. e., a contest over the fact deemed proved by the pre-
sumption may take place. After the fourteenth year the presump-
tion is, that the accused is mentally capable of crime, and that pre-
sumption is rebuttable. The first attack is over the base of the pre-
sumption, namely, the age of the accused, and the final contest is
over the fact deemed proved by the presumption, namely, mental
capacity for crime.
Physical capacity for crime is treated in somewhat the same
manner. It is presumed, for example, that a boy under fourteen
years of age cannot commit rape or attempt to commit rape, but
some jurisdictions make the presumption rebuttable, while others
make it conclusive.
The proof used to overcome and rebut a presumption (called
"conflicting" proof) is sometimes actually introduced at the time re-
quired by the burden or duty of going forward with the proof. Some-
times it is actually introduced at some other time or times in the
trial or hearing. But the time for introducing it always exists,
either actually or merely logically, because a presumption always
determines (as previously defined) the burden or duty of going for-
ward with proof, and the proof used to overcome and rebut a pre-
sumption always relates to the time, actual or logical, when it must
be introduced or produced under that burden or duty. A presump-
tion sometimes must be rebutted at some fixed time, either actual or
3If it be a rule of the substantive common law that a person under seven years
old has not mental capacity for crime, then there exists no presumption that a
person under seven years old lacks that capacity. But if the rule of substantive
law be, that a person must possess mental capacity for crime before he can be
punished, then it is up to the law of proof to establish whether or not that capacity
exists, and there exists a presumption that a person under seven years old lacks
that capacity. It seems more logical to hold that the latter is the true state of
affairs. That would establish one rule of substantive law for all places where
common law prevails, and leave the proof of capacity or incapacity subject to
peculiar conditions of different localities. And it would place all questions of
establishing capacity or incapacity within the law of proof, and not divide them
between the substantive law and the law of proof.
The force of our illustration in the text is not destroyed by any uncertainty as
to whether or not there exists a conclusive presumption of mental incapacity for
crime if the accused is not over seven years old. Any conclusive presumption
would answer the same purpose.
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merely logical, during the trial or hearing, i. e., before all the proof
in the case is in, because the determining of the burden or duty of
going forward with the proof requires it. In some cases the presump-
tion is carried, with all the proof in the case, to the end of the taking
of proof before it is deemed "rebutted."
As above explained, when a rebuttable presumption is "overcome",
a presumptio hominis is substituted in its place as the controlling
process of reasoning. The question then becomes one of a presumptio
hominis subject to the same rule of burden of proof as if there had
been no presumption. And the base of the presumptio hominis is all
the proof in the case, relating to the question to be answered, including
the "conflicting" proof and the base of the defunct presumptio juris
itself.
"Conflicting" proof used in "overcoming" a presumption must be
of real merit. A presumption should not be allowed to be "overcome"
by a sham showing, made for the purpose of causing to be applied a
presumptio hominis really upon the same base that underlies the
presumptio juris, in the hope that the homo will make an inferenae
different from that made by the presumptio juris.
It must be remembered that often (including instances of a con-
clusive presumption) the law does not supply the base of a presump-
tion, but the homo must himself find that the base exists, i. e., that
the facts from which the inference is made exist, before he can apply
the presumptio juris involved. If he finds that that base exists, and
there is no "conflicting" proof involved, then he must apply the pre-
sumption. But if he finds that that base exists, and there is "con-
flicting" proof involved, then he must apply the process of a pre-
sumptio hominis.
Can there exist a "conflict of presumptions" or "conflicting pre-
sumptions"?
These expressions are confined to rebuttable presumptions.
Presumptions cannot conflict unless they are on opposite sides of
a controversy, i. e., they do not conflict if they act in favor of the
same party; and in order to be conflicting they must be active on
opposite sides of the controversy at the same time. Nor. can they
conflict unless they absolutely and completely negative each other,
i. e., they must be equally broad.
There is no such thing in our law as a conflict of presumptions.
Rebuttable presumptions always determine the burden of going
forward with proof, in the sense explained above. There can not
exist in the same case at the same time two burdens of going forward
in opposite directions with the proof-such a situation would or
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could produce a standstill or deadlock in procedure; the duty of
going forward with proof would simultaneously pull in opposite
directions, and that our law does not tolerate; indeed, it is unthinkable
in any system of judicial proof.
There can exist in a case a sequence of presumptions. Such a se-
quence is a series or succession of presumptions. If two presumptions
in favor of the same party are active at the same time they are par-
allel presumptions; but if they act at separate times they constitute
a sequence of presumptions.4 But a sequence of presumptions is not
confined to such a situation, for there can be a sequence of presump-
tions between the two parties, one being in favor of one party at one
time, the next in favor of the other party thereafter. The observance
of the actual or logical burden of going forward with the proof, and
of the shifting of that burden, brings this matter out clearly.
It must not be forgotten that a presumption may sometimes (and
nearly always does) relate to only a single or isolated fact in a chain
of facts involved in an issue or defense, and thus produce a shifting
of the burden or duty of going forward with proof as to that fact only.
In other words, such shifting of the burden or duty of going forward
with proof does not refer to the whole of the issue or defense. When
such presumption is one of a sequence of presumptions there does not
result a shifting of the burden of going forward with proof on the
entire issue or defense from one party to the other. The shifting refers
to only the single or isolated fact. In short, a whole issue or defense
or "case" does not swing in every sequense of presumptions. Where
there is such a swing, a "prima facie case" has been established.
There may, during the trial of a case, be many such incidental
facts which are links in the chain of proof. That gives a broad field
within which presumptions relating to such facts may interchange or
interplay.
It is to be remembered that "conflicting" proof to overcome or
rebut a presumptio Juris does not necessarily have to be introduced
by the party against whom the presumption operates. It may be
produced by the party in whose favor it runs. And it is, of course,
sufficient if it is brought out upon cross-examination of his witnesses.
It may be produced by both parties-sme by each. In other words,
how or by whom the "conflicting" proof is introduced is immaterial.
And it is immaterial how or by whom the proof establishing the
base of a presumption is introduced.
4They may not arise at the same time, but if they at any time are active to-
gether they are parallel during that time. Thus they may arise in sequence and
become parallel.
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As to the time for overcoming or rebutting presumptions, there
need not be a direct, actual, intentional, formal adjustment of the
burden of rebutting presumptions, or the burden of going forward
with the proof. Sometimes it is necessary that the step be so taken
or to make an actual, formal ruling on the point at a particular time.
Sometimes it is not desirable, possible or practicable to do so. Some-
times where the point is not raised, or where it is impossible or
impracticable to make the ruling at a particular time, e. g., because of
the impossibility of separating the proof into disconnected portions,
or because some proof relates to more than one presumption, or
because of otherwise useless interruptions in the procedure, the
ruling is not necessary. Some courts even require a party to put in
all his proof at once or at one time. There results a mass of proof,
accumulated without regard to a precise observance of the procedural
steps. But that proof should be handled in the logical order of those
steps. If, for example, there is a sequence of presumptions, each
presumption should be considered and disposed of in its logical order.
One of the points in handling presumptions which bother the
courts most is that at which the principle is applied that, when a
presumptio juris is "overcome" the question becomes one of a Pre-
sumptio homninis subject to the same rule of burden of proof as if
there had been no presumptio juris. When this point is reached the
courts sometimes flounder. Or, to apply metaphors taken from the
national game, when it comes in their direction, either they cannot
see it, or they "muff" or "fumble". Even when they make a "good
catch" they seem to fail to appreciate the logical processes that lead
to the correct result, for those processes are not satisfactorily ex-
plained by them. Their analysis is not clear, because their con-
ception of the whole doctrine of presumptions is not clear. They are
hazily conscious of the doctrine, but they do not elucidate it. They
do not distinguish neatly between "overcoming" and "rebutting".
They do not notice carefully when the presumptio juris vanishes as a
controlling process of reasoning, and the presumptic hominis is sub-
stituted. After the "overcoming", the question is: What amount
or weight of proof is necessary to "rebut"? The answer to this
question depends upon the burden of establishing the case or upon
the burden of proving a particular fact, incident, issue or defense.
Sometimes the proof, to rebut, must outweigh or overbalance the
proof establishing the presumptio juris. Sometimes it need only
counterbalance it. Sometimes not even that much is required. If
the burden of establishing the case or the particular fact, incident,
issue or defense and the burden of rebutting the presumption. rest
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-upon the same party, then overbalancing proof is necessary-just
how much it must overbalance depends upon the degree of proof
involved ("beyond a reasonable doubt", "preponderance of the
proof," "clear and convincing proof," etc.). If these two burdens are
not upon the same party, then only counterbalancing proof is neces-
sary, if the burden of proof involved requires preponderance of the
proof; but less than counterbalancing proof is necessary if the burden
of proof involved requires "clear and convincing" proof or a similar
standard. If in any instance the proof required to "rebut" is not
produced, the presumption is not "rebutted," although it may be
"overcome", i. e., vanquished as a controlling process of reasoning.5
In bigamy and kindred cases there is no conflict of presumptions,
but merely a sequence of presumptions. In all such cases there
necessarily arise two presumptions, namely, one of the continuance
of life (or, saying it differently, the continuance of the existence of a
prior marriage) and one of the legality of a subsequent marriage.
They cannot conflict, because, as already pointed out, if they did
they would produce a deadlock in procedure, which is something
unknown and impossible in our law. They can arise only in sequence,
and perhaps the one whose base is first proved is the first to arise;
but as the two are always present in the case, it answers no purpose
to theorize about which arises first and which arises in sequence to the
first. In solving the problem presented to them, some courts have
been led astray by some idea of one of the two presumptions being
"stronger" than the other, whereas what is stronger is, not one of
the presumptions, but the persuasive force of the facts favoring a
particular inference in a presumplio hominis into which a presumpiio
juris has been turned (or, otherwise expressed, which has been
substituted for a presumptio juris) by virtue of "conflicting" proof.
The bases of the two presumptiones juris unavoidably "conflict",
and thus each presumptio juris is turned by the base of the other into
a presumptio hominis. What really results is, that the two pre-
sumptiones juris are turned into one composite presumptio homils,
for the question becomes one of one broad, comprehensive presumptio
homnids. In solving that presumptio hominis the result depends upon
the combined persuasive force of the base of one of the two pre-
sumptiones juris and any and all other proof favoring an inference
like the one in that presumptio juris, on the one hand, and the com-
bined persuasive force of the base of the other of the two presumptiones
'We should here like to discuss Klunc v. Railway 74 Ohio State 125 (19o6),
Ginn v. Dolan, 81 Ohio State 121 (i909), and McAdams v. McAdams, 8o Ohio
State 232 (1909).
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juris and any and all other proof favoring an inference like the one
in that other presumptio juris, on the other hand. In short, all the
proof bearing on the question is taken into consideration, and one or
the other of the two presumptiones juris becomes rebutted, according
as the persuasive force of the proof leads, in the mind of the homo,
to one or the other of two possible inferences. Some courts lean
towards a rebuttal of the presumption of the continuance of the
prior marriage, but that is not a good rule of law. It should not be
a rule of law, because such a rule would sometimes result in a crass
miscarriage of justice. However, it has appealed strongly to some
courts, because forsooth it tunes in with the so-called "presumption
of innocence", with which the bar has bewitched the bench. So
some courts have declared that it is a rule of law that the "presump-
tion of innocence" (by which is meant presumption of the legality of
a subsequent marriage) is "stronger" than the presumption of the
continuance of a prior marriage. Some courts have even been carried
so far as to hold, that a subsequent marriage shall conclusively be
presumed to be valid unless it is shown that both parties to the
prior marriage were actually, and not inferentially, alive at the time
of the subsequent marriage. Yea, even if both parties to the prior
marriage are so shown to be alive, some courts say it shall be presumed
that they have been divorced, unless the negative (no divorce) be
proved. But why should the law in any case say the sacredness of
a prior marriage and of the rights flowing from it is destroyed by a
suspicious subsequent marriage?6
The trouble with "conflicting presumptions" started in England.
We stumblingly followed her. It has been an instance of the blind
leading the blind and both falling into the ditch.
In the ubiquitous case of The King v. The Inhabitants of Twyning,7
which was decided in 1819, and is the usual starting point in the
discussion of "conflicting presumptions", a man, after living with
his wife a few months, enlisted, about 1812, as a soldier, went abroad
on foreign service, and was not heard of thereafter; in a little more
than twelve months after he left, his wife married a second time, and
two children were born of the second marriage. The children and
woman became paupers. The proceeding was not a criminal one,
but a civil action-to determine whether or not Twyning was to
6Space forbids following this up at length. We should like to quote from
Turner v. Williams, 202 Mass. 500, 504-505 (1909). Cf. Colored Knights of
Pythias v. Tucker, 92 Miss. 501 (19o8), Williams v. Williams, 63 Wis. 58 (1885),
which reviews leading English cases. As to the tendency in the other direction,
see Maier v. Brock, 222 Mo. 74 (1909).7The King v. The Inhabitants of Twyning, 2 Barn. & Ald. 386 (i8ig).
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support the woman and the children. She was not accused of
bigamy. No one was on trial for the commission of a crime. There
arose in the case no question of a presumption of innocence in a
criminal case. Whether or not any one committed a crime was
really foreign to the question. The question was whether or not the
second marriage was legal. That question was determinable regard-
less of the fact whether or not a crime was committed, and of the
fact whether or not a crime was intended. Two presumptions arose
in the case. One was that the second marriage was legal; the other,
that the life of the first husband continued until the time of the.
second marriage (or, expressed differently, that the first marriage
continued until the time of the second marriage).
The two presumptions arose in sequence. They did not "conflict",
because, if they had "conflicted", they would or could have produced
a deadlock in procedure, which would be intolerable in our law, as
previously stated.
For our present purpose it is not important to know which of the
two presumptions arose first, because they were both "overcome".
The base of the presumption of the legality of the second marriage
was the proof as to the second marriage itself. The base of the pre-
sumption of the continuance of life was the proof as to the interval of
less than seven years between the disappearance of the first husband
and the second marriage. These two bases "conflicted" and thereby
reciprocally tuined the two presumptions into presumptionfes homi-
nis-the base of each presumption turned the other presumption into
a presumptio hominis. There was additional "conflicting" proof which
assisted in turning the presumption of the continuance of life into a
presumptio hominis, namely, that the first husband, when he dis-
appeared, enlisted as a soldier in the foreign service.
The case resulted correctly, because it would, under the circum-
stances of the case, have been unreasonable to find that the life of the
first husband continued until the time of the second marriaee. A
strong point in making the inference that the first husband had died
before the time of the second marriage would have been the fact
that the first husband, when he disappeared, had enlisted as a
soldier and gone abroad on foreign service. That meant more in 1812
than it would now. Other things weighing in making the inference
of the death of the first husband would have been the facts, that
finding the first husband was alive at the time of the second marriage
would have made the woman a bigamist and the children bastards
and all of them social outcasts. In making the inference of the death
of the first husband man would pay more attention to the social and
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legal (other than criminal) consequences (to the woman and the
children) of an illegal marriage than to whether or not the illegal
marriage would be a crime. Moreover, the first husband dropped
out of the case without leaving any question as to his property or
his heirs. There was nothing in the case justifying a finding that the
second marriage was illegal.
The final result in the case was satisfactory, but the court did not
handle the case properly. There was no "conflict of presumptions".
The court was certainly wrong in turning the presumption of the
continuance of life into a parallel presumption; which the court did,
by saying the presumption of law was that the first husband was
dead at the time of the second marriage, thus paralleling the pre-
sumption of the legality of the second marriage. If the court had said
that there was a presumptio hominis of such death, it would have
stated the matter correctly. There is not even a presumptio juris
that a person absent seven years was dead at any particular time
during the seven years of his absence.
It must be remembered that presumptions were not well understood
in 18i9. The court was so carried away with the importance of the
"presumption of innocence" in a criminal case, that it lost all sense
of perspective. There escaped its notice the fact that whether or not
the presumption of the legality of the second marriage was "rebutted"
depended upon the persuasive force of proof supporting an inference
of the continuance of life. It also failed to consider what degree of
proof would satisfy it that the first husband was alive at the time of
the second marriage. The decision is not clear-cut, and has been
made the subject of much discussion, and it will never be determined
whether or not the court, on the face of its rulings, held, that, in the
absence of direct proof that the absent spouse was positively, actually
alive at the time of the second marriage, the presumption of the
legality of the second marriage controls absolutely; that is, in the
absence of such proof, the presumption as to the continuance of life
is not even turned into a presumptio hominis. That would make the
presumption of the legality of the second marriage conclusive. But
we think the court did not mean to go that far. It does not use such
an expression as "direct," "positive" or "conclusive" proof, but only
says "unless proof has been given that the first husband was alive
at the time". But that was said in the face of the fact that the
husband had been absent only "a little more than twelve months"
before the second marriage.
There should be no difficulty in handling a criminal case of bigamy
or adultery involving the presumption of the continuance of life or,
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putting it differently, the presumption of the continuance of a prior
marriage.
In The Queen v. Lumley,8 the court left the question of the con-
tinuance of life in a criminal bigamy case to the jury, saying "the
law makes no presumption either way" as to that question. We
agree that the presumption of the continuance of life in the case
should have been deemed turned into a presumptio hominis, but we
can not agree with the court when it says there is never a presumptio
juris of the continuance of life, but "that * * * is always a question
of fact."
Reg. v. Willshire,9 was a similar bigamy case. The court correctly
held that the question of the continuance of life should havebeen
left to the jury, i. e., it was made a presumptio hominis; but the court
did not elucidate clearly any theory or principle in its ruling. It
seems, however, to support the position that the mere fact of a
second marriage is "conflicting" proof, and "conflicting" proof of
enough merit to "overcome" the presumptio juris of the continuance
of life and turn it into a presumptio hominis.10
There is no justification for saying, as was said in State v. Plyrn,"
a criminal bigamy case involving the same question of the con-
tinuance of life, that it is not "true that there is any presumption
of law one way or the other as to the continuance of life", and that
the inference of the continuance of life is one that may or may not
be made. In some cases it must be made, and where it must be
made, nothing but a presumptio juris can make it. Where it must be
made, man (a jury, for instance,) can not make a contrary inference.
The court in Reg. v. Willshire, supra, recognized the existence of the
presumptio juris of the continuance of life. 12
All the proof does not appear in the report of State v. Plym, but
enough appears, to show that the presumptio juris of the continuance
of life was "rebutted"; so the result seems to be correct. The theory
upon which the decision was based is unsound, however.
In some cases of divorce on the ground of adultery, indictments
for bigamy, criminal conversation, and the like, it is ruled, as a
matter of law, that an actual, formal marriage must be proved by
direct proof, and the presumption or inference of marriage from
cohabitation, acknowledgement, reputation, etc., will not be enter-
sThe Queen v. Lumley, L. R. i Cro. Cas. Res. 196. (decided in 1869).9Reg. v. Willshire, 6 Q. B. Div. 366. (decided in i881).
'
0Apparently the presumption of death from absence dropped out of the case
because the base of it had not been proved.
"State v. Plym, 43 Minn. 385 (decided in 189o).
"2For a good review of the English cases up to 1885, see Williams v. Williams63 Wis. 58 (x[885).
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tained. In the absence of such direct proof there can not arise, in a
"conflict" or otherwise, a presumption of the validity of a prior
marriage, because a prior marriage has not been proved. Not even
evidence or pr6of of a prior marriage from cohabitation, acknowledge-
ment, reputation, etc., will be entertained. The effect is, that, in the
absence of direct proof of an actual, formal prior marriage, the
marriage attacked is conclusively presumed to be valid-the pre-
sumption of its validity becomes a conclusive presumption.
Somewhere above it is stated that the bar has bewitched the bench
with "presumption of innocence". Doubtless an explanation of that
statement is expected.
It is not the property of a presumption to fix the burden of estab-
lishing the case. It has no duty or function in connection with the
fixing of that burden. That burden is fixed by law, independently of
any presumption. Man-the homo-has nothing to do with it.
A presumption is a step in the proof-stage of a case, and such a step
can be taken only after the burden of establishing the case is fixed.
It always operates to assist in meeting or defeating the burden of
establishing the case. It never acts until after that burden has been
fixed. All of which is clear, because the proof-stage of a case, i. e.,
the stage when proof is introducible in the case, does not begin until
after the burden of establishing the case is fixed, that is to say, placed
upon somebody.
The so-called presumption of innocence in a criminal case is not a
legitimate presumption. It is a bastard presumption; and, like
other bastards, it has caused considerable trouble. It is not a
legitimate presumption because nothing is deemed proved by it. It is
neither a fact nor a theory that the accused in a criminal case starts
out with his innocence deemed proved in his favor. The homo has no
part in the "presumption of innocence". The law acts alone in
prescribing it. It precedes the proof-stage of the case, which a
presumption cannot do. It precedes the appearance of the homo
in the case, and there is no presumption without the homo.
Whatever the reason for, or the method of justification or ex-
planation of, fixing the burden of establishing the case, neither a
presumptio juris nor a presumptio hominis has anything to do with it.
The great force given to, and the great stress laid upon, the
"presumption of innocence" in criminal cases developed from the rule
that guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This rule in
the mouths of adroit, influential members of the bar produced a
"presumption of innocence". The expression so persisted that it
became adopted by the bench, and has become so important that it
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has been ruled that it must be embodied, and, apparently, in proprio
nomine, in the charge to the jury.13 This is how we interpret the
historical development of "presumption of innocence", given to us
by Prof. Thayer.14 We believe that this historical development,
culminating in the obsession of the courts by "presumption of
innocence", revealed in so many adjudicated cases (even civil cases)
right up to the present time, justifies the assertion that the bar has
bewitched the bench.
Historically, therefore, "presumption of innocence" in crI~inal
cases is apparently a bastard, as far as the law of proof is concerned.
We believe, and have attempted to show, that, schematically, as a
presumption, it is a bastard. Moreover, even if it were a true pre-
sumption, it would serve no schematically useful purpose in the law
of proof. What would be the use of having two things-a burden of
establishing the case and a presumption of innocence-functioning
together, in the same way and to the same end, in connection with
the determination of the burden of going forward with proof, es-
pecially since the burden of establishing the case determines the
amount or degree of proof, while the presumption of innocence does
not? The latter would add nothing to the former; on the contrary,
in our judgment, it would rather subtract from it, because it says
nothing about the amount or degree of proof.
"Presumption of innocence" in a criminal case is a rule or maxim
of the substantive law, which has been erroneously engrafted on the
law of proof. It should be cut off and restored to its proper place,
namely, in the substantive law. The rule or maxim should "hold",
instead of "presume", that one is innocent until proven guilty. It
simply defines a certain relationship or simply says, that a certain
relationship, or the effects of a certain relationship, shall continue
until guilt is actually proved, without saying anything about how
guilt shall be established. It is translatable into terms of a relation-
ship, and not into terms of the proof or disproof of a relationship.
Everything translatable into the terms of a relationship is part of the
substantive law. Everything translatable into terms of the proof or
disproof of a relationship is a part of the law of proof, which is a
part of the remedial law. The confusion in connection with "pre-
sumption of innocence" has been caused by the effort to make it a
rule of the law of proof.
"
1See Coffin v. United States, i56 U. S., 432 (1895).
14
"A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law," pp. 552-56o.
As to Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432 (1895), see the same work, pp. 566-
571.
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In essence and principle there is no difference between the "pre-
sumption of innocence" in criminal cases and the so-called presump-
tion of innocence in quasi-criminal cases and purely civil cases. In
none of them is it a true presumption. In all of them it is a spurious
presumption. All "presumptions of innocence" express a rule of
substantive law.
The only escape from the conclusions reached above about "pre-
sumption of innocence" in criminal cases is to hold that by "pre-
sumption of innocence" the innocence of the accused is deened
proved in favor of the accused. Such a presumption would, of course,
be a rebuttable one. It would be "overcome" in every case tried on
the merits. It would be "rebutted" if and when the burden of
establishing the case should be met. The base of it would be, of
course, the every-day or usual affairs of life or experience of mankind,
which would be considered judicially noticed. But, as already asked,
what useful purpose would be served by adding such a rule of the
law of proof as a presumption of innocence to the rule requiring
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, which is itself a rule of the
law of proof? Why not let the content of one be expressed in terms
of the substantive law, and the content of the other be expressed in
terms of the law of proof? That would avoid the confusion which must
inevitably arise if in the same branch of the law the same content is
expressed wholly in one formula and partially in another formula of
no similarity of terms. As for the rest, is it undesirable to have the
one formula of the substantive and the other formula of the law of
proof? One mentions guilt. The other mentions innocence. Which
would counsel for the defense prefer to emphasize? Does not that
explain the very genesis of "presumption of innocence"?
It is perhaps not an evil thing that the bench has been bewitched,
because the spirit of our law is one of zealousness for emphasizing
innocence. As long as we have a rule of law called "presumption of
innocence" it may be perfectly proper and even necessary to cover
it in a charge to the jury, but it is not evidence or proof, any more
than any other rule of law properly included in a charge to the jury
is evidence or proof. The accused is entitled to the benefit and pro-
tection of it,15 as he is entitled to the benefit and protection of any
other rule of law in his favor.
Whether "presumption of innocence" is a rule of the substantive
law or a rule of the law of proof may be of no practical importance
to the practitioner, but the student of systematic law demands, when
'rThis is what was apparently in the back of the mind of the court in Coffin v-
United States, z56 U. S. 432 (1895).
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possible, clarity and order and everything in its proper place. Clarity
harms no one. May it not help everyone interested or affected?
If we must have a rule of law, why not place it where it belongs in
our scheme of law? It strikes us that "presumption of innocence"
is a rule or maxim of the substantive law and not a presumption in
the law of proof.
There are certain other so-called presumptions that are not real
presumptions.
"Ignorance of the law excuses no one" is a rule of the substantive
law. The true rule is, that the consequences growing out of a
relationship are the same whether one has knowledge of them or not.
No expression of proof or disproof of the relationship is involved in
that rule. Nothing is deemed proved by the rule. Indeed, neither
ignorance of the law nor knowledge of the law is subject to proof or
disproof one way or the other. Thus the expression "Every one will
be presumed to know the law" is not correct. There is here no
presumption one way or the other. Ignorance of the law or knowledge
of the law not being open to proof or disproof, there is no place in
connection therewith for proof, and hence no place for a presumption
or any other rule of proof. "Presumed" here can not mean deemed
proved, but, if it has any real meaning, only "held," so that the rule
should run as follows: "Every one will be held to know the law," or
"Every one is held to know the law."
If, however, we had a rule of substantive law that in certain cases
ignorance of the law would excuse one, there could be a legitimate or
real "presumption" of knowledge (or ignorance) of the law, because
we would then have a question of proof. That knowledge (or ignor-
ance) could be deemed proved--say, by the process of a rebuttable
presumption. In those cases the knowledge or ignorance would be
subject to proof or disproof. The situation would therefore justify
the existence of a presumption or some other rule of proof.
The same reasoning applies to the so-called presumption that every
one will be presumed to intend th natural and probable consequences
of his acts. Intent cuts no figure in the rule of law in question. It is
not subject to proof or disproof one way or the other. The conse-
quences of the acts are the same whether intended or not intended.
So that this rule is a rule of the substantive law, and it should be
worded as follows: "Every one will be (or is) held to intend the
natural and probable consequences of his acts." Nothing is deemed
proved by the rule.
But where intent is subject to proof or disproof we can have a real,
legitimate presumption. Thus presumptions relating to intent or
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malice in certain cases are real presumptions. Something is deemed
praved by them.
It is possible (but unfortunate, because of resulting confusion)
that the word "presume" or "presumption" may be used in the
substantive law, but if it is, it is used in some sense other than that
of something being "deemed proved." If an inference of fact in the
proof or disproof of something is meant or intended, we have a real
"presumption" of the law of proof. If an inference of fact in the
proof or disproof of something is not meant or intended, the so-called
presumption is spurious, so far as the law of proof is concerned, and
"presumed" must be translated in terms of "holding" to a right or
duty, or in some term or terms other than that of being "deemed
proved". Sometimes such "presumptions" relate solely to procedure
as such and distinct from the law of proof.
A real presumption in the law has no place outside a court or similar
proceeding. That shows it can not be part of the substantive law.
If We had never had a law of proof, we would not hear of real pre-
sumptions in the law today, i. e., presumptions whereby something
is deemed proved.
Ordinarily, the question whether a certain "presumption" is a
part of the substantive law or a part of the law of proof is of no
practical importance as long as either decision can be applied and
the result of either will be the same as that of the other. But it is
conceivable that it may be of importance even under such conditions.
For instance, where it is held that all the substantive law is contained
in a written code, the law of proof, being a part of the remedial law,
could come to the relief of humanity with presumptions, but the
substantive law could not help out.
But let us have a clearly systematized exposition of the law, with
every feature logically and schematically in its proper place!
